CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 573rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Today, the business before the Conference is consideration of reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies as well as consideration and adoption of its annual report to the General Assembly. However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative may, if he wishes, raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on today's list of speakers the representatives of Canada, the Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, may I begin by expressing my pleasure at seeing you in the Chair, and by pledging to you the full support and co-operation of my delegation in helping you to carry out your presidential responsibilities during this final, important month of the formal 1990 session.

The only item I intend to address today is the item on chemical weapons. I will offer some Canadian comments on the progress achieved to date in the 1990 session. I also wish to address the priorities my Government attaches to particular aspects of our negotiations on the proposed chemical weapons convention. Further, I will introduce two Canadian technical studies relating to the issues of toxicity determination and the possible costs of operating an international inspectorate. Lastly, I wish to address our recently submitted report on the latest national trial inspection conducted by my authorities.

Mr. President, as we are in the final weeks of the formal 1990 session, it would seem appropriate to offer a Canadian assessment of our achievements to date. In our view, some very useful and important work has been accomplished in the summer session.

Ambassador Hyltenius, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, has advanced work on article IX by taking a fresh look at the material upon which such an article could be based. Under his overall direction:

> Working Group A has further considered ways of improving the "protocol on inspection procedures", in particular the section on "alleged use" and the overlaps with the annexes to article VI, and has begun examining the proposal for ad hoc verification;
>
> Working Group B has been particularly successful in finding solutions to some critical technical issues related to articles IV, V and VI, in particular on thresholds, definitions, and dates, and on elements of the question of the "order of destruction";
>
> Working Group C has carefully worked out texts on "amendments", "settlement of disputes", and "measures to redress a situation" which seem to enjoy a high degree of general support and which offer the hope that these issues might well now be on the way to final resolution;

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Lastly, the various "friends of the Chair" on such issues as article X, "old chemical weapons", and "jurisdiction and control" have made very laudable efforts to develop consensus approaches to these long-standing issues.

Notwithstanding these advances, however, we are disappointed and disturbed that more was not achieved during this past summer, particularly given the sense of heightened expectations that seemed to prevail during the spring session - expectations that my delegation certainly shared, as I indicated in my statement of 24 April.

This failure to achieve greater progress is surprising also in view of the signing, on 1 June, of the United States/USSR bilateral agreement for the cessation of CW production and the destruction of all but 5,000 agent tonnes of their CW stockpiles by 31 December 2002. My Government welcomed that agreement and hoped that it would further facilitate the early conclusion of our multilateral negotiations here in Geneva.

In saying this, I should note that my delegation is not one of those that believe that all it will take to wind up our negotiations and produce a draft convention for signature is sheer political will. Certainly that will be necessary, but there yet remain a number of major, crucial issues to be resolved. There are also important technical questions that still need to be thoroughly addressed if we are to produce a truly effective convention.

The reasons for this limited progress seem as varied as they are elusive. Some have indeed pointed to an alleged lack of willpower. Or perhaps there is an unreadiness in some quarters to accept that we might actually be on the verge of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Others might point to an insidious, dangerous, degradation of the overall negotiating climate, where chemical weapons proliferation is increasing and where chemical weapons are seen by some - erroneously, we believe - as a "poor man's" weapon of mass destruction.

Quite irrespective of the current situation in the Middle East, that area has been a source of particular concern for some time because of the approach of some States in the region to chemical weapons. Chemical weapons were used there not long ago and, recently, threats to use CW have been made which then provoked counter-threats. We call upon all countries to refrain from such potentially inflammatory statements. These can only contribute to heightened tension and greater uncertainty. Canada firmly believes that chemical weapons should have no place in the armouries of modern nations, and that the only road to real security against the chemical weapons threat lies in the negotiation of a global ban on chemical weapons, on which we in the Conference on Disarmament are now actively engaged.

The Canadian Government's position is very clear: we firmly support the goal of a total ban on chemical weapons. And we want to see this achieved as soon as is feasible - not tomorrow or next week, but also not 5 or 10 years from now. Delay can only add to the risk of greater proliferation and greater use of chemical weapons.

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We also want a convention that realizes our goal of a total ban to be global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable. These three terms are not just catchwords; in our view they are essential if there is to be a total ban.

By "global", we mean a convention to which all of us here (members and observers alike) - and the approximately 80 other States not participating in these negotiations - will wish to become parties. We seek a convention which has addressed the security interests of CW-possessors and non-possessors alike. In this respect, we have carefully noted the recent statements of the Egyptian representative, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, of the Chinese representative, and of the representatives of the United States and the USSR concerning the latter's joint proposals for revisions to the draft convention, contained in document CD/CW/WP.303. My Government believes that the issues raised and the related concerns and differences of view expressed by these and other speakers are vitally important to the nature of the future convention. They must be addressed by us in a thorough and frank manner in our actual negotiations, as opposed to being aired in statements in plenary.

By "comprehensive", we mean a convention that bans the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons; that provides for the complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities; and that otherwise encompasses all activities that might be relevant to its goals. A convention that does not unequivocally provide these results raises serious concerns in our mind. These concerns stem from our position on globality. The convention must attract the widest possible adherence. The surest path to widest adherence is through the convention's comprehensiveness, i.e. complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities by the end of the envisaged 10-year destruction period as is provided for in the current rolling text. To Canada, this implies an undertaking at the outset of the convention to pursue these destruction processes to their completion.

By "effectively verifiable", we mean a convention that empowers the implementing organization with the means and authority to investigate, inspect and pursue any activity that might be related to non-compliance with the convention.

While all three criteria are essential, I should like to underline the importance of the last, and truly effective verification régime. This in our view would be the only way to provide us with the necessary confidence in, and the means of ensuring, a total ban. The implementing organization must not only be responsible for supervising or monitoring the complete and final destruction of declared stocks and production facilities, and the activities of declared facilities producing scheduled chemicals; it must also be able to investigate activities and, as necessary, inspect undeclared facilities.

We are therefore convinced that, to be effective, the verification régime under the convention must be as complete as possible and intrusive to an extent not hitherto realized under any other arms control agreement. In the first instance, this means a challenge inspection component of exceptional rigour. Whether we call it "challenge inspection" or "inspection on request"

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or however we may characterize it, it stands as the ultimate safety net of the convention - the final means under the convention whereby a State party can seek assurance that other States parties remain in full compliance with their obligations.

Notwithstanding the well-understood apprehensions of some negotiators, we are also convinced that a highly intrusive challenge inspection régime - one that includes access to any site and which ensures that, if it so wishes, the State initiating the inspection process may be represented during it by the presence of an observer - can be made to work without unduly compromising those concerns. In this respect, we have noted the recent statements of Mr. Waldegrave, of the United Kingdom, and the paper he introduced (CD/1012) reporting on his country's experiences in conducting national trial challenge inspections. We also have noted the statement of Ambassador von Wagner, of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 7 August, in which he introduced paper CD/1026. While we recognize that the results of the United Kingdom national trial inspections and those of similar trial inspections elsewhere may not be accepted by some as conclusive, they are highly instructive and offer a concrete basis upon which negotiators can more knowledgeably approach the remaining difficulties with this apsect of the verification issue.

But even when we have satisfactorily resolved the challenge inspection issue, Canada still believes that the verification system for the convention would require additional measures if it is to be effective, measures which would go beyond those of article VI and which would enable the international inspectorate to inspect undeclared facilities, but without invoking the full panoply of article IX: in short, ad hoc verification.

To our minds, ad hoc verification provides the means whereby the international inspectorate can, in a routine manner and with the minimum necessary amount of intrusiveness, periodically "sample" the activities of undeclared facilities and thereby ensure that there are no activities going on at such facilities that would threaten the purposes of the convention. From this perspective, ad hoc verification should not be seen as a substitute for or an extention of challenge inspection; rather, it complements the régime by providing another needed component for effective verification.

We regret that this summer's discussions have revealed that, despite what we had thought were clear explanations of both the Australian paper (CD/CW/WP.286) of 11 April and the United States working paper (CD/CW/WP.300) of 27 June, there is still a considerable amount of concern and uncertainty about what ad hoc verification would involve. We hope that during the next few months, particularly in the intersessional discussions, we and other supporters of the concept will be able to better explain both our reasons for recommending it and its implications. At the same time, we would expect that other negotiators will approach further discussions on this issue with an open and constructive mind.

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We are convinced that if we can develop a fully effective verification régime - one that incorporates both a rigorous challenge inspection component and an ad hoc verification component - we will have leapt over perhaps the biggest remaining hurdle to the realization of the convention. There are, as indicated, a number of other major problems that are critical to ensuring the globality and comprehensiveness of the convention, but we believe that they, too, can be best addressed through a constructive and open-minded attitude. My delegation therefore entertains high hopes for the fruitfulness of our forthcoming intersessional discussions and during the next session, accentuated somewhat by the tang of our disappointment with the limited results of the current session.

To assist in these future deliberations, my delegation will soon be circulating, through the secretariat, two further papers for consideration by other delegations in the months to come. The first of these is a study that addresses the issue of the costs of maintaining an international inspectorate. This study, which was conducted by an expert consultant on behalf of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs and International Trade, Canada, builds upon the very useful work done some years ago by the Netherlands and United Kingdom delegations, as well as others, and also takes into account more recent data that have become available, particularly about stockpiles and facilities.

For each type of inspection or other verification activity envisaged under the convention, the study posits a series of assumptions about the number of sites involved, the likely size and tasks of the inspection team, the number of days required to complete those tasks, and the possible unit cost of each inspector, and thereby calculates the costs of each form of inspection and the cumulative cost of maintaining the inspectorate. I should like to underline that, in positing such assumptions, the study by no means intends to suggest that the figures cited should be regarded as categorical or definitive. Nor, indeed, do such assumptions represent the judgement of the Canadian Government on what such figures should be. But they do represent a serious attempt, on our part at least, to begin to make educated estimates of the general scale of the effort required. As such, they are intended to engender reflection, further discussion and debate. It is therefore our hope that this study will be considered useful and will help further discussion of the financial implications of the verification régime envisaged under the convention.

The second study that we will be circulating examines and assesses procedures for toxicity determination. This is an internal study that was carried out to assist the Canadian Government and our delegation in determining how to address this topic when and if it arose again in our negotiations. While this topic is not currently being addressed in discussions, it underlies many of the technical aspects that are still under consideration. We believe that the results of our study are interesting and warrant being shared with other delegations in order to assist negotiators in reaching a rational approach to the question of toxicity.

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Lastly, I should like to inform you that we have just circulated document CD/CW/WP.319, of 10 August: a report on a national trial inspection that the Canadian authorities recently carried out, our first such inspection of a commercial facility. This trial inspection involved an examination of the consumption of a simulated "schedule 2" chemical at a pharmaceutical plant. The main focus of the trial inspection was the use of auditing procedures to determine how effective these would be in tracking a particular chemical. I should like to note that one interesting result appears to be that such procedures could be used without encroaching seriously upon confidential business information. Another significant feature was that the presence of a foreign observer - in this case an official from the Netherlands Government - did not increase the confidentiality concerns of the facility being inspected.

Mr. President, I hope that the foregoing comments and the studies and reports noted will be seen as constructive and concrete demonstrations of my Government's firm commitment to negotiating an effective, total ban on the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. Notwithstanding our disappointment that more has not been achieved, we continue to have high expectations that a successful conclusion to our negotiations in the near future is within our grasp. It is in that frame of mind that my delegation will be approaching our intersessional discussions and the 1991 session.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon, for his statement and his kind words regarding the President. I also thank him for introducing his delegation's two working papers.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Sang Ock Lee.

Mr. Sang Ock LEE (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, upon taking the floor for the first time in the second part of the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like, on behalf of the delegation of the Republic of Korea, to extend to you our warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August, and wish you every success in discharging your important responsibilities at the final phase of the work. I take this opportunity also to pay tribute to the two preceding Presidents - Ambassador de Rivero, of Peru, and Ambassador Sujka, of the Republic of Poland - for the competent and devoted leadership with which they steered the Conference in the busy months of June and July.

The world is now undergoing significant changes, with wider vision and a longer-term perspective. As the unification process of Germany sets into motion, efforts are being actively pursued both by East and West to put an end to the Cold War confrontation and to lay the groundwork for a stable and secure environment for the whole of Europe. On 7 July, the NATO Summit, held in London, put forward through its joint declaration a set of proposals containing wide-ranging disarmament and confidence-building measures, with far-reaching implications to the European security system. One month earlier,

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the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty met in Moscow and released a declaration on 7 June, elaborating new perceptions and visions of the changing realities of Europe.

Amid the process of transformation, the contours to be drawn for the politico-military landscape of the future Europe remain to be seen. However, it is a matter of certainty that the undertakings agreed upon between the two camps and among other parties concerned are bound to move forward the ongoing disarmament negotiations. After all, the process we are witnessing today amply demonstrates that progress in arms control and disarmament is possible with mutual trust and confidence, the creation of which is to a great extent attributable to the climate of openness and co-operation.

With reference to the Conference's work on the convention to ban chemical weapons, the concrete results born out of the agreement signed between the United States and the Soviet Union at their summit in Washington in May-June have evidently contributed to promoting heightened expectations over the prospect of the positive impact it may give to the multilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. On the other hand, the frustration voiced over the pace of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament may well be illustrative of the underlying importance of resolving key issues such as inspections on request.

My country's commitment to the ban on chemical weapons is full and definite. At the Ministerial Conference on Chemical Weapons held in Paris in January last year, the Foreign Minister of my country made it clear that the Republic of Korea is not in possession of chemical weapons, nor has it the intention to acquire or produce them.

The Workshop on Chemical Weapons in Münster in June, hosted by the Federal Republic of Germany, provided us with a valuable opportunity to familiarize ourselves with the destruction and verification aspects of chemical weapons. It was a very useful and enlightening experience; particularly the magnitude of costs and safety measures involved with destruction struck us as another important dimension of the problems deserving much attention and consideration.

In the nuclear field, the year 1990 may well be registered as eventful. The agreement reached between the two super-Powers at the Washington Summit to reduce their respective strategic offensive arms underlines another major step forward in the area of nuclear disarmament since the signing of the INF Treaty.

The Conference on Disarmament saw the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and the preparatory consultations held in New York paved the way for the convocation of the Amendment Conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in January next year.

As the Fourth NPT Review Conference is fast approaching, it becomes the foremost preoccupation of the world disarmament community. In view of the particular importance attached to the future of the NPT beyond 1995, all the pertinent issues are expected to come under most exhaustive review. No doubt,

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a full-scope safeguards agreement under IAEA is an essential obligation under the non-proliferation régime. Yet, a certain party to the régime, possessing nuclear facilities and putting this vital commitment on hold, provokes suspicion and misgivings within the world community. My delegation once again calls upon it to place its entire nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of IAEA as expeditiously as possible.

The reforms and changes which led to the breaking down of the Berlin Wall have reached out almost everywhere, and yet the Korean peninsula remains the world's least affected area. With the German unification process actively and speedily under way, and with North and South Yemen merged into one, it is no surprise that the world community increasingly focuses its attention on the Korean peninsula and with a sense of anxiety wonders when a comparable change will take place in the only partitioned nation remaining on Earth.

Indeed, positive developments began to occur. Highlighting these, were the meetings of President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union in San Francisco, and later with President Bush of the United States in Washington, on the occasion of the summit talks between the two super-Powers held in May-June of this year. These meetings underscore the importance of promoting normalization of relations among the States in the region and a climate of détente on the Korean peninsula.

An agreement has recently been reached in the preliminary talks between the South and the North of Korea to arrange for the holding of a high-level meeting to be led by the Prime Ministers from both sides in September and October alternately in each other's capital. On the agenda of the meeting is the resolution of the inter-Korean political-military confrontation, and the realization of exchanges and co-operation between the two parts of Korea. These will be the highest-level talks ever held and will give rise to renewed hope for resolution of vital issues central to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and the ultimate unification of Korea.

The most merited aspect in the development is the re-opening of the channel of dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two parts of Korea. In this regard, we sincerely hope that the other, suspended inter-Korean dialogues - known as the Red Cross talks, the economic talks, and the parliamentary talks - will also be resumed as soon as possible. The special statement made by President Roh on 20 July 1990, calling for the mutual opening of the border and free travel, is another bold step aimed at breaking the inter-Korean deadlock and creating a climate of openness and reconciliation. We hope that an agreement on inter-Korean travel and communications will be concluded at an early date with a view to promoting mutual opening and exchanges, as we proposed at the beginning of this year.

In our earlier statement made at the spring session this year, my delegation, taking the example of European experiences, stressed the importance of mutual opening, trust and reconciliation as a necessary condition leading to confidence-building and arms-control and disarmament negotiations, and expressed the view that the two sides of Korea should make

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bona fide efforts to create such a vital environment. Now, with the inter-Korean dialogue to be resumed in less than one month's time, the two parts of Korea are put to a test with a dual task: building confidence and consolidating security and peace on the Korean peninsula.

It is a time of changes, changes for the better. We have good reason to keep our hopes alive and high.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I wish to thank the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Sang Ock Lee for his statement and the kind words he had for the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Nasseri.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): In the Name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

Mr. President, allow me at the outset to express my congratulations to you for presiding over our work in the month of August. You have all the confidence and support of my delegation in discharging the weighty responsibility of fructifying the laborious job of the Conference on Disarmament for 1990. I also wish to express my deep gratitude and appreciation to our previous President, the distinguished Ambassador of Peru, for the excellent manner in which he conducted our work at this Conference.

I have pleasure today, Mr. President, in presenting the advance copy of the national trial inspection carried out in the Islamic Republic of Iran to assess the degree of applicability of the procedures and provisions of the convention we have agreed upon so far. It was not too difficult to gain the support and, in fact, the decision of the Government to move forward with the inspection, because it was well in line with the importance and serious attention that my country attaches to the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of the production, development and use of chemical weapons. To receive the full and solid co-operation of all the departments, institutions and industry concerned proved, however, to be a more demanding task, and it required tireless efforts by the organizers to enable them to carry on with the inspection as originally planned and to meet the schedule.

The aim, as I said, was to evaluate how far the agreed provisions are applicable and also to provide the possibility of sharing the views and experience with the delegations involved in these negotiations. The preparatory work, from the inception to submission of the final report, took about one and a half months. The actual inspection was carried out in two days, with 14 experts involved. The inspection site was a plant producing DDVP, which is an agent for production of insecticide. The team consisted of specialists in toxicology, chemical analysis, chemical engineering, instrumentation engineering and industrial-military management. The objective was to conduct a routine inspection in accordance with the provisions of document CD/961.

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The results of this meticulous inspection can be summarized as follows:

Analysis of the samples taken proved that no chemical was produced other than what had been declared before. In order to verify the results, analysis was made, partly inside the plant and partly outside. Samples were also sent to the Department of Chemistry of Tabriz University, where the results corroborated the previous ones;

With the experiences gained during the course of the war, the scientific potential and knowledge of the Iranian experts was at a very good level;

Industrial auditors checked the records to account for the receipt and delivery of chemicals - which showed no inaccuracy in the data provided.

On the basis of this trial inspection and with the practical experiences gained from it, we wish to make the following observations and recommendations for consideration in the convention:

1. The trial showed that implementation of routine inspection is well possible but, with the help of qualified personnel, time and expenses of the inspection will be economized. In this regard, it is advisable to have special training courses for the inspectors.

2. The cost of the routine inspection in Iran was about 40 to 45 thousand dollars. In the light of the high cost of inspection and also the large number of chemical plants, it is suggested to categorize plants and inspection accordingly, so as to optimize the inspection costs.

3. The general volume of routine inspection reports is estimated to be very high at the international level. In order to strengthen the operational methods of inspection, there is a need to define and establish norms for observation and information-gathering for various needs of inspection. The result of unification of the assessment system will be the speedy conclusion of reports by the organization of the convention.

4. The inspection revealed that although existing defined equipment is sufficient, yet there is a need for making the analysis equipment more mobile so that chemicals of low concentration can be identified on site. In this connection, efforts which are now under way by Finland to identify more efficient methods of analysis of chemical agents and the development of the means of instruments required should be valued and appreciated.

5. Among other important issues for the future is standardization methods of analysis and means of calibration of equipment, and establishment of a data base by the organization. It is therefore high time that measures be taken in this regard.

(Mr. Nasseri, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Mr. President, while I have the floor, I would like now to take the opportunity to make a few remarks with regard to the convention on chemical weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran, having faced the bitter experience of the use of chemical weapons, has done its utmost to sensitize the international community in order to pave the way for an effective and comprehensive convention on the total elimination and prohibition of the development, stockpiling, production and use of chemical weapons. The history of the use of these weapons in the past vividly testifies to the need for a comprehensive convention with clear and unambiguous provisions for its implementation. The convention which is now under negotiation has great security implications for Iran and hence we follow the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament on this subject with great care, attention and interest.

For the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, the historical approach is a plausible one, but the impact of science and technology in various fields, such as chemistry, chemical engineering, mechanics and bio-technology, should also be studied and be taken into account. This convention is to be an important international instrument which has to prove its applicability for generations to come. This first real and universal experience in disarmament should be crowned with success. In this respect, the trend of progress of such weapons - which will create a potential capacity in shadow - should be carefully studied and identified, and necessary measures should be taken in response to technological and scientific development.

Therefore, our scientific, legal and technical discussions and deliberations should be based upon a scenario approach in order to prevent any possible loopholes in the future. Such an approach will enable us to foresee all contingencies and work out necessary measures in the convention.

There is no doubt that we are working for a multilateral convention in which States with different industrial and scientific capabilities are expected to join. Their security requirements also differ with respect to their regions, which dictate various degrees of security priorities. These topics were taken up this year in the Chairman's open-ended consultations on undiminished security. I have to note with some regret that these exchanges of candid views did not continue.

It is important to remind the Conference that the conditions leading to a bilateral agreement, which is based upon a balance of hidden capacity of chemical weapons production, differ drastically from those of a multilateral accord, which should be based upon a clear perception of security for all. It is therefore not advisable to hastily translate such an agreement into a multilateral accord and persuade the negotiating parties to follow the same prescription. There is no doubt that many positive and productive deductions can be drawn from the bilateral agreement, provided that other pertinent conditions be taken into account before efforts are made to generalize them. Our work should be based upon "precision" and "speed", the basic requirements for a successful conclusion of the convention.

(Mr. Nasseri, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Before closing, I would like to register the sincere thanks and appreciation of my delegation to the relentless efforts and patience shown by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, who enabled us to enter into more meaningful and deep discussions this year. Notwithstanding the outcome of the work of the Ad hoc Committee for 1990, his valuable contributions will be highly appreciated.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Nasseri, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I also thank him for presenting an advance copy of his delegation's working paper on trial inspection.

I have no other speakers on my list. Are there any delegations that wish to take the floor? That is not the case.

I would like to inform you that at our next plenary meeting I intend to submit, for the Conference's decision, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/1027, and the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, circulated as document CD/1028.

In keeping with the Conference's timetable of meetings for this week, open-ended informal consultations on the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 7, 8, 3 and 2 will be held in Room I, immediately after this plenary meeting.

There being no other business before us today, I intend to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 16 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.